The form �nd justification of inductive inference rules depend strongly on the represent�tion of uncertainty. This paper examines one generic representation, namely, incomplete information.
The notion can be formalized by presuming that the re}�vant probabilities rn a decision problem are known only to the extent that they belong to a class K of proba bility distributions.
The concept is a generalization of a frequent suggestion that uncertainty be represented by inter vals or ranges on probabi 1 ities.
To maKe the representation useful for decisionmaking, an inductive rule can be formulated which determines, in a well-defined manner, a best approximation to the unknown pr·obability, given the set K.
In addition, the knowledge set notion entails a natural procedure for updating--modi fying the set K given new evidence.
Several non-intuitive consequences of updating emphasize the differences between i nfer·ence w i th comp I e te and inference with i ncomp 1 e te information.
2.
Knowledge �
The basic frame of reference is an algebra of sets E; i.e., a set of events closed under disjunction and negation. In a medical context, for example, E might be the combined set of disease states, symptoms, and test results.
It is assumed that there is a probab i I i ty function .E. on E; hc• wever·, .E. is not completely Known. What is known is that f is con tained in a set K of probability functions on E.
Thus, some bounds on the pr·obab i 1 it i es may be known, or the expectation of one or more random variables may be Known, and the 1 ike. In the case of complete ignor·ance, K i�. the class Z of all possible probabi 1 ity functions on E.
For the case of com plete information, K is a unit set.
In the general case, K is some subset of z.
Roughly, the size of the knowledge set K represents the degree of uncertainty concerning P.
A large K indicates high uncertainty, a small K indicates fairly complete infor·mation. The relationship K C K' imposes a partial order, in fact a lattice, on the subsets of z.
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�K is less uncertain than K'".
For a given event e, the inter 0al max P<e) -m in P<e) is a rough measure of the uncer tainty concerning e. The K nowledge set representat i on of uncertainty is the starting point for a number of approaches to decisions with i ncomp I e te i nfor·ma t ion, inc 1 ud i ng the game-aga i nst-na tur·e [Wald, 50; Blackwell and Girshick, 541, several variants of maximum en tropy methods [Jaynes, 68; Kullbac K , 59] , and the author's min-score theory of induction, which is a general i zation of the first two [Dalkey, 82] .
One approach to uncertainty that has aroused consider able interest as a potential "inference engine" for expert systems is the Dempster-Shafer belief-function theory.
[Shafer, 76; Gordon and Short! iffe, 84J
At first glance, be 1 i ef functions do not appear· to fit the knowledge set represen tat i c• n; however, K >'burg ha• recent 1 >' shown that th at a belief function Bel can be mapped onto a class of proba bility functionE. K<Bel), namely, th e s.et of P''E · such that P<e) � Bel<e> for al 1 e in E.
[Kyburg, 85J On this representation, Bel(e) = min P(e). As Kyburg points out, K<Bel ) knowledge sets are much more general than belief functions; any Bel can be expressed by a K, but most K's cannot be expressed by a Bel.
3.
Inductive Inference A Knowledge set K--especially if it is l arge--is not a very useful guide for action.
Belief functions, for example have been criticised on the gr ounds that they do not have a clear role in decision analysis.
The game against nature, maximum entropy methods and min-score the or>' bridge the gap be tween a knowledge set and decisions by invoKing a form of inductive inference. By assumption, the actual probability f is in K; a natural question is, can a "best guess" be selected fr·om K which is, in a reasonable sense, a best approximat ion to f?
The question presupposes a measure of the goodness of the approximation.
An appropriate measure is available in the theory of proper scor es .
Consider a partition of events E, and an estimate Q which is a probability distribution on E A score rule is a function S<Q,e) which assigns a � at i n g to the estimate Q depending on which event e in E occurs. A score rule is called proper (admissable) if it fulfills the condition
That is, a sco�e rule is called proper if the expectation of the score is a max i mum when the estimate is the same There is an infinite family of functions which fulfill < 1).
Among these ar·e the 1 ogar i thm i c score S< Q , .,_ e) = 1 og Q( e) and the quadratic score S(Q, e) = 2Q(e) -L Q(e). An impor-E tant sub-family consists of the decisional scores: Let U<a, e) be the payoff if action a is taken and e is the state of nature.
Let a*(Q) be the optimal action assuming Q is the distribution on the states of nature.
S(Q, e) = U<a*(Q), e) is a proper score.
Decisional scores furnish an intimate tie betw�en deci · sion theory and the theory of inference.
It is convenient to introduce the definitions: GCP, Q) = I P(e)S(Q, e); H<P> = G<P, P) = r P(e)SCP, e). E E Given a knowledge set K, if a distribution Q is posited the actual expectation is G<f_, Q),
The analyst would like to select a Q to make this quantity as large as possible; however, since f is unKnown, a direct maximization of G<f, Q) is undefinable. On the other hand, the analyst can determine the Q which maximizes the minimum (over P) of G<P, Q).
The maxmin clearly can be guaranteed and thus can be consid e red a lower bound to what can be obtained, Knowing K.
An upper bound can be set by examining the value of additional information.
In the theory of decisions with complete information, it is a theorem that additional infor· mation leads to a higher expectation.
[Lavalle, 78] This result is often called the positive value of information <PVD pr·inciple.
Ther·e is no way to demonstr-ate PVI for incomplete infor-mation.
However, the principle ap . pears to apply a for-tiori to the case of uncer-tainty, and hence is a reasonable candidate for a new postulate.
In the previous section, it was noted that if K C K", then K is mor-e i nfor· ative than K".
We thus are led to the postulate:
Pl. If K C K" and K is not empty, V<K> � VCK'. >
Here V<K> designates the value of knowing K. An immediate consequence of P1 is V<K> 'V<P>, P any member· c • f K, c• r· e-qui valently, V<K> �min V<P>. K Despite the apparent weakness of Pl, it has the strong consequence that a strict upper bound to the value of Knowing K is the minimum value of any me-mber of K.
The-e-xpression V<K> was introduced informally; however, it seems reasonable to interpret V<P> as H<P>.
Thus, we can summarize
H< P> .
Thus the bounds set by (2) ar-e pr-ecisely the bounds set by the game against natur-e, wh•re P is a strategy selected by natur-e, and Q is a str-ategy selected by the analyst. Many critics have objected to the game against nature on the gr-ounds that it assumes "natur-e" is both rational and hos tile; however, <2> does · r.ot involve either-assumption.
The upper bound is imposed by the r-equir-ement that addi tional infor·mation be-of positive value.
If K is convex and closed, the game against nature has a solution. [BlacKwell and GirshicK, 54, theorem 2.5. 11
For some scores such as the log score or the quadraditic score, wher·e G< P ,Q) is str· i c t 1 y concave in Q, ther·e is a pur·e str·a tegy for both the analyst and nature, and we can assert max min =m in max--the lower and upper bounds coincide. In this case min H<P> is the unique solution, leading to the infer·ence rule Min-scor-e r-u I e:
Given a Know I edge set K and a scor·e r-ule S, select as a best guess the Q in K that minimizes H(Q).
For the logarithmic score, HCP> = I P<e>logP(e) = E -Entropy<P>.
Thus, the min-score rule is equivalent to the maximum entropy rule for the log score.
The min-score rule can also be applied to the associated class K(Bel) of a belief function Bel, thus affording a tie between belief functions and decision theory.
4.

Updating
In addition to an inference rule, a complete theory of induction requires an updating procedure, i.e., a method of revising an estimate given new evidence.
In effect, this entails a method of modifying the Knowledge set K based on the new evidence, since the revised estimate can then be ob tained by applying the min-score rule to the new K.
UnliKe classic probability theory, updating with uncer tainty requires two separate procedures, depending on whether the new evidence affects or does not affect the unknown probability f.
Strictly, a knowledge class K should be en visaged as deriving from some body of evidence I, and thus be denoted by K<I>, say.
As long as K remains fixed within a pr-oblem, there is no need to formalize the dependence on I. If new evidence I·' becomes ava i 1 able, however, the role of I/ in modifying K must be made explicit.
One Kind of new evidence does not change the underlying unKnown probabi 1 ity f., but only what is Knc. wn about f. As a simple example, supf:• C•se at fir-st the investigator Knows only the average of some r-andom variable, but at a later-date lear-ns the variance as well.
Clearly, the same E is involved; all that has changed is that more information about E. is now available. We can call modifying K in 1 ight of evidence which does not chi.nge the underlying probability Knowledge updating.
If the appropriate Knowledge set K<I') based separately on the new evidence I' can be determined, then clearly the new Knowledge set K<I.I') = K<I>.K<I')--the inter section of the old and additional Knowledge sets.
Knowledge updating is roughly analogous to Dempster's orthogonal-sum composition for belief functions, but has a number of advantages:
(1) No assumptions concerning the i ' ndependence of the old and additional evidence is requir·ed.
(2) The procedure contains a built-in consistency checK; if K<I.I·') is empt>-, then one or· both of the two pieces of evidence is incorrect.
(3) The procedure fulfi lis the posi tive value of infor·mation in a str·ong way; K<I.J') c K<I>, and max P<e> -min P(e) �m ax P<e> -m in P(e) for every K<I.J')
The second type--information updating--extends classical updating to the case of uncertainty.
The proto-type is that in which the new evidence I' consists of learning that some event e in E has occurred.
In this case, the new K con � ists of conditioning each Q in the old K on the event e, or for·ma 11 y K<I.e) = CPithere is a Q in K and P = Q(• fe)) It is noteworthy that since every Q in K is a complete proba bility function, everything is Known to compute the condit ion a 1 fun c t i on Q ( • I e) • Informational updating is the analogue of the Shafer condi tiona! belief function Bel<AIB), but is considerably more general, since it applies to K"s which ar·e not belief functions, and even for belief functions may be more exten sive than the K generated by Bel<AIB).
No new consequences concerning min-score inference re su 1 t from Knowledge updating; however, direct app 1 i cat i c• n of the min-score rule to K's derived from informational updat ing will generally lead to misestimates--a topic deserving a separate section.
5.
Min-scor-e Infer-ence with Information Updating By definition, since E. is in K<I>, E.<• I e) is in K<I.e). ·Thus, it would appear at first glance that the justification of the min-score rule for-K<I> would carry over to K<l.e). However·, pr-oblems can ar·ise, illustr-ated by the followir•g example:
Suppose we have an experiment with binary events e and e, and binar-y obser-vations i and T.
Let p denote the prior-probability of e, q the 1 ikel ihood of i given e, and r the 1 ikel ihood of i given e.
Suppose p is completely un Known, but q and r are Known.
Without loss of generality, we can suppose q > r.
If we set p = r/Cq-r>, then the pos terior of e given i is 1/2.
Thus, for any symmetric score r·ule, the min-scor·e estimate for the posterior is completely un i formative.
The difficulty is that the naive application of the min-score rule does not employ all the information that is avai lable; it over·looKs the fact that we knc• w something about i.
To rectify this oversight, it is necessary to ex tend the ana 1 ys is by tr·ea t i ng the new K as an i ncomp 1 e te 1 Y Known information system.
An information system consists of a set of events of interest or hypotheses E and a set of potential observations (data, signals, symptoms, messages, etc.) I.
There is a joint pr·obability distribution P<E.I) on hypotheses and observations; but the probabilities of direct interest are the conditional distributions P<Eil) of the events given the observations. as The expected score of an information system is defined
I E where S<i ,e) is shorthand for the score obtained if PCel i) is the estimate and event e occurs.
In words, the total expected score for the information system is the average of the expected scores for conditional estimates based on the observations. For the case of uncertainty, where K is a set of joint distributions PCE.I) , the appropriate application of the min score rule is to select the joint distribution Q out of K which minimizes the expected score H<EII) .
In that way, all of the information in K is taKen into account. It can be shown that the two basic properties--guaranteed expectation ar.d PVI--hold for this procedure. £ D alkey, 80J
As an elementary example, consider the case of the exper· i men t with unKnown prior cited above.
K consists of all joint distributions on E and I derivable by setting p to any value between 0 and 1.
If we opt for the logarith mic score, the inference consists in selecting out of K the minimally informative information system.
An equi valent statement of the problem is to select out of the interval [0,1] a best-guess prior P* which minimizes HCEII) . The second formulation has some historical interest; the issue of dealing with unKnown pr· i ors is is old as the theorem of Bayes.
For this elementary example, P* can be found by solving for p the implicit equation )q-r _e_ e = pq+<1-p>r , 1-p p < 1 -q) + < 1 -p) ( 1-r ) (3) is not particularly "intuitive".
In effect, it udownplays"--i .e., gives lower prior weight to--the more info�mative hypothes�•·
('3)
If the example is extended to multiple observations, some surprising effects appear.
The best-guess prior com puted for a single observation is not the same as the prior computed for several observations; the prior is a function of the number· of obser·vations.
This r·esult suggests that the amount of information in large samples with unKnown prior is decidedly less than indicated by classical sampling theory.
In the case of complete information, a posterior distr·ibution obtained from an obser·vation can be used as a new prior to predict the occurrance of subsequent obser vations.
This transfer is not valid for min-score priors; a new prior must be determined for the prediction. £Da1Key, 85J
Thus, there is a basic difference between the diagnostic import and the prognostic import of observations, a fact of some consequence for the configuration of expert systems.
